ABSTRACT This paper examines the relationship between student debt and the changing terrain of work in U.S. culture, while attending to how these shifts mark a speci cally gendered, racialized phenomenon. Drawing on the AAUW's 2017 report on student debt, this paper examines the gure of the fashion intern in order to think about how the gender and racial inequities in student debt collude with what Angela McRobbie terms 'the feminization of work' to effect a gendered, racialized form of indebtedness. I assert that the 'do what you love' ethos described by Miya Tokumitsu contributes to the proliferation of feminized work in the culture industries, such as fashion, and the perpetuation of racial exclusivity within the industry.
exibility of the female workforce, " leading to a growth in female workers within the creative industries marked by precarity and immateriality, such as fashion. In this way, both the demographics of the labor force as well as the labor itself became feminized, because the very work becoming "increasingly precarious, and under compensated" was, and is, explicitly "reliant on 'soft' skills such as communication, affect and cognition. " In other words, the feminization of work also entails the proliferation of those skills presumed "natural" to female persons (e.g., service, nurturance, and communication), but also long associated with the pink collar professions. However, this is not to assert a gender essentialism, but rather to acknowledge how modes of laboring historically associated with women (e.g., emotional, service-oriented, boundary-less, and unwaged) now characterize the labor of many immaterial workers. As Christina Morini argues, "in cognitive capitalism precariousness, mobility, and fragmentation become constituent elements of the work of all persons irrespective of gender. The model advanced is pliable, hyper-exible, and in this sense, it draws on the baggage of female experience. " Thus, to discuss the feminization of work is to acknowledge that in the post-Fordist era, not only are women participating in elds like the culture industries at an unprecedented rate, but the immaterial labor they undertake is feminizing in that it re-enforces a gender structure wherein woman-identi ed persons are disadvantaged via precarious employment. The signi cance of gender to understanding immateriality and student debt is especially worthy of consideration then because woman-identi ed persons are further in debt, are less likely to secure the kind of employment after graduation to pay it back, and (as I discuss below) are over-represented in those labor forms that remain very low-waged, if waged at all.
At the same time, race also occupies a central role in understanding the gendered machinations of student indebtedness. As the gures regarding student indebtedness above highlight, debt repayment is most dif cult for Latinas and African-American women, while it remains less so for white and Asian-American women. Thus, to speak of gendered indebtedness is to speak of racialized, gendered indebtedness, as the persons most impacted by student debt are women of color. This aspect of student indebtedness is not unrelated to the feminization of work. As Minh-Ha Pham outlines in her discussion of the invisible labors of Asian fashion superbloggers, "the racialization of women's work has also bene tted white women" (emphasis added). As Evelyn Nakano Glenn argues, the nineteenth-century "cult of domesticity" that structured gender relations depended on the invisible domestic labors of women (and men) of color, effectively establishing a racial strati cation within the realm of women's work. Thus, while the feminization of work "draws on the baggage of female experience, " it necessarily draws on the historical realities of women's work that have produced racial strati cations among women, of which white women have bene tted. The historical legacies of these strati cations continue in numerous forms of gendered, racialized labors that effectively reproduce a racial hierarchy wherein economically privileged, white women consume and bene t from the labors of women of color. I examine the gure of the fashion intern because she illustrates how such racial strati cations among women are reproduced and intensi ed via student indebtedness. Additionally, as I outline below, the fashion intern is a particularly apt example because she highlights how racial strati cations within culture industries such as fashion are perpetuated. suggests that exploitation is something that one can opt out of, because if one loves their work, then not only are they not exploited, but they are not working. In a 2014 Jacobin magazine article shared over 65,000 times on social media (and published as a book in 2015), author Miya Tokumitsu argues that the discourse of "do what you love" bears considerable advantages to capitalism, while hurting workers everywhere. As Tokumitsu asserts, "According to this way of thinking, labor is not something one does for compensation, but an act of self-love. " In this analysis, doing what one loves ensures spiritual ful llment, albeit with adequate bene ts and compensation perceived as incidentals, rather than necessities for survival.
Taken in the context of mass student debt, I pursue the following questions: What kinds of work are made possible, or impossible through the imperative to "do what one loves"? How does the imperative to "do what you love" intensify inequity along economic, racial, and gendered lines, especially within the context of mass debt? And, more speci cally, how might the directive to "love" one's work, to warrant work null through "love, " mark a particularly gendered manifestation of indebtedness? Pursuing these questions, I examine the gure of the fashion intern, whose gendered, culturally unrecognizable labor is a part of the broader proliferation of precarious labor forms marked by "instability, the absence of legal contracts (of employment abiding by legal standards) lack of protection and social bene ts, lack of collective agreement of employment, and low wages" that permeate and characterize most of the culture industries in the current moment. The fashion intern is one of the most iconic yet culturally unrecognizable fashion workers, and I assert that this misrecognition is because the fashion intern "loves" what she does, and thus does not work. I examine the fashion intern in order to think about how the gender and racial inequities evident in student debt collude with the feminization of cultural work, effecting a gendered, racialized form of indebtedness.
Examining the gure of the fashion intern then is an attempt to illustrate two important aspects crucial to understanding the structure of student debt and immaterial labor in the current moment. The rst concerns the way in which immaterial labor, particularly that within the culture industries like fashion, is increasingly gendered feminine. This gendering occurs through the feminization of work that entails an increase in womanidenti ed persons undertaking these labors, but also the way in which this labor is characterized by its exibility, adaptability, emotion work, and lack of a wage. The gure of the fashion intern is exemplary in this regard, as her labor, despite being crucial to the operations of fashion, remains culturally unrecognizable and unwaged. The second aspect concerns how the combination of mass student indebtedness and unpaid internships effectively prohibits women of color speci cally, and indebted students generally, from entering elds within the culture industries such as fashion. As a 2012 study undertaken by The Chronicle of Higher Ed illustrates, internships remain the primary route with which recent graduates and/or new workers gain entry to their desired professions.
Internships throughout the culture industries, however, tend to be unpaid, demanding work that is economically prohibitive for any person carrying a signi cant debt load.
Examining the gure of the fashion intern demonstrates how labor that-for all intents and purposes-exploits its workers and is compelled for free, nonetheless simultaneously acts as a means by which to bar the most economically vulnerable and historically underrepresented groups in these very industries. Thus, while the gure of the fashion intern highlights the feminization of immaterial work, she also exempli es the ways in which "the categories of free labor and the various forms of subjugated labor-including slave labor, indentured labor, and sweated labor-are economic expressions of racial and gendered logics. " Examining the gure of the fashion intern, then, is a means with which to articulate both the racial and gendered logics that underpin her exploitation but also the ways in which the racial inequities that permeate the fashion industry are perpetuated.
The paper is divided into four sections. In the rst section, "The Politics of Student Debt, " I return to the AAUW's report on student debt in order to represent how student debt disproportionately impacts women, and women of color speci cally. I then situate this research alongside scholarship on debt to clarify how the AAUW's research con rms many of the theories present in the literature. In the next section, "Immaterial Labor and Doing What You Love, " I trace how the shift to a precarious, knowledge economy entails a reorientation to work, and argue that the ethos of "do what you love" ful lls this reorientation. As I argue below, "do what you love" provides the ideological underpinnings necessary to prolonged precarious employment, and justi es the social exclusions for which industries such as fashion are infamously known. Discussing student debt and immaterial labor together I aim to show how an ethos of "do what you love" is both necessary to sustaining a precarious, immaterial economy undergirded by debt, but also, bears a distinctly gendered aspect. In the next section, "Fashion Interns, " I examine the gure of the fashion intern, whose iconicity in U.S. media overshadows her unwaged, 
The Politics of Student Debt
As the AAUW reports, women possess "nearly two-thirds of the outstanding student debt in the US. " On the surface, this imbalance along gender lines re ects the changes in student population in higher education over the last sixty years. Women now earn more than half (57 percent) of bachelor's degrees in the U.S., and between 1976 and 2014 the total number of undergraduate students identifying as not-white "more than doubled from 16 percent to 42 percent. " However, these shifts in student population cannot account for the reality of student debt inequity. While the median household income has stagnated since 1976, the "median cost of college attendance has more than doubled since then. " This soaring cost of college attendance has unequally impacted women; women take on an average of 44 percent of debt for undergraduate education, compared to 39 percent for men. As the AAUW notes, this discrepancy between debt load is exacerbated by the gender pay gap, because: "Women working full time with college degrees make 26 percent less than their male counterparts, " which means less money to put towards repayment of student loans.
For women of color, the rising cost of college attendance and gender pay gap is most severe. As noted in the AAUW report, wealth in the US is distributed along racial lines, as white and Asian families tend to have much higher incomes and accrued familial wealth than black or Latino families. These discrepancies in total accrued wealth means that black and Latino students have less economic support from family members, and are more likely to cover the total costs of their education as individuals. These differences are re ected in the AAUW's research: "[T]he typical black woman who graduated with a bachelor's degree in 2011-12 did so with about $29,000 in student loans while black men averaged $25,000 . . . Asian graduates had the lowest debt, averaging about $11,000 in debt at graduation. " While black students-regardless of gender-share the bulk of student debt, it is black women who comprise the most indebted on average. As the AAUW states, "Women-especially women of color-are most likely to experience dif culties, 34 percent of all women and 57 percent of black women who were repaying While the gains in diversity in higher education are positive outcomes of the legislative policies and political movements of the previous century, in order to be truly transformative, they must entail actual gains post-graduation. The inability to meet basic needs because one has obtained an advanced degree does not re ect an actual step towards equity in higher education; particularly because it is the very students held up as proof of change (i.e., students of color, women, rst-generation students, women of color) who are struggling in this endeavor. Many of these students are also nontraditional students: parents of dependent children (including single parents), students nancially independent of their parents, veterans, students re-entering college after signi cant time away (and thus often older), part-time students, and students working full-time while enrolled are increasingly entering post-secondary institutions. Many of these nontraditional students are "disproportionately women, people of color, and rstgeneration college students. " Additionally, many of these students face hurdles to completing their college education that traditional students do not: balancing work and class schedules, nding affordable, dependent childcare, and facing interpersonal and psychological dif culties succeeding in an atmosphere catering to a much younger, childless, non-working student population. For single parents in particular (now more than 26 percent of all degree-seeking post-secondary students in the US), completing a college degree will pose the most dif culty. As the AAUW states: "Most student parents-69 percent-are low income, de ned as at or below 200 percent of the federal poverty level, " many of whom are also single parents (54 percent), and women (71 percent).
Students with dependent children are more likely to take on larger amounts of debt, and take a longer amount of time to nish their degree programs (which also tends to entail a higher debt load). However, completing a degree program, regardless of debt load, is far better than leaving without a degree. As the AAUW report outlines, students who leave college before completing are more likely to default on their student loans, and it tends to be nontraditional students who leave college before completing their programs.
There is much to be gleaned from the AAUW's research on student debt, but perhaps the most signi cant to the present study is the way in which student debt works towards reinforcing existing social hierarchies through the very promise of transforming them. In this regard, the AAUW report af rms much of the theoretical insights garnered from recent literature concerning indebtedness. In his 2012 text, The Making of the Indebted Man, Lazzarato argues that the debtor-creditor relationship "intensi es mechanisms of exploitation and domination at every level of society, " via a slow yet consistent tax on one's future wages and possibilities. As the AAUW report highlights, student debt works towards a calci cation of the very structural and social inequities higher education is often touted as transcending, such as socioeconomic class. Taken as an intensi er of exploitation and inequity, student debt succeeds in this endeavor, as the students entering college with the least social and economic capital stand to leave with the most debt, and demonstrate the most dif culty repaying it. For example, this function of student debt is quite evident when considering the pro tability of loan defaults, the most lucrative opportunities for creditors. As noted above, nontraditional students are not only most likely to leave college before obtaining a degree, but as such, they are also the most likely to default. In this way, the very students already facing barriers to degree completion (such as childcare, ageism, work-school balance, etc.) become the most pro table to the student-debt system through their failure. Thus, rather than enabling more students to obtain a degree once previously prohibitive, student debt has expanded the opportunities for exploitation and domination already in place. In addition to the intensi cation of material inequities, the debt economy entails a reguration of subjectivity itself. As Lazzarato outlines, the predominance of the debtorcreditor relation in capitalist society comprises a material (i.e., economic indebtedness and thus a diminishment of one's overall wages) as well as a subjective component. As Lazzarato states, "It is debt and the creditor-debtor relationship that make up the subjective paradigm of modern-day capitalism, in which 'labor' is coupled with 'work on the self' , in which economic activity and the ethico-political activity of producing the subject go hand in hand. " It is this "work on the self" that is so signi cant to understanding student debt; accepted as a necessary burden in order to obtain economic and social capital, student debt differs from other kinds of debt in that it is most often framed as a means to a better life. Taking on student debt means that one is taking steps towards a better future, even if that future is compromised by rising debt load. As Ross argues, while the subjective component of student debt includes individuated kinds of violence, such as depression, suicide, and divorce, it simultaneously guides the means of protest, as publicly revealing and "owning" one's debt did during the Occupy protests of 2011. This personalized aspect of debt is quite evident in the AAUW study, as a signi cant portion of women-especially black women-reported "very high levels of stress about repayment. " In sum, the subjective power of debt remains, and when taken in the context of a shifting terrain of work, bears relevance to understanding why an ethos
of "do what you love" contributes to gendered indebtedness. Namely, taken in the context of mass debt and precarious employment, as a spiritual and professional ethos, "do what you love" suggests that work-with or without a wage-is simply enough. As Lazzarato argues, as both an economically material and subjectifying experience, debt recon gures the ways in which individuals perceive waged labor. Because debt represents a deprivation on future time and money, the substance and meaning in waged work shifts, particularly for those kinds of employment necessarily entailing debt. Speaking to this, Lazzarato states, "The dedication, the subjective motivation, and the work on the self preached by management since the 1980s have become an injunction to take upon oneself the costs of economic and nancial disaster. " Lazzarato's comments are signi cant because they point towards the ways in which the injunction to take on debt intersects with ideological imperatives to better oneself, and live one's best life, regardless of actual material improvements to one's overall well-being. In the next section I suggest that the ethos of "do what you love" provides the "injunction to take upon oneself the costs of economic and nancial disaster" by sustaining prolonged precarious employment.
Immaterial Labor and Doing What You Love
The concept of immaterial labor undergirds much of the recent scholarship concerning precarious labor, drawing signi cantly on the work of autonomous Marxism, speci cally inaugurating a critical shift in the nature of work, and thus the power dynamics of capital accumulation. This transformation marks a shift in labor within the Western world. The advancement of technology to the production process, the mobility of capital, and the aftermath of worker revolts of the 1960s and 1970s worked to transform the labor process so that the worker is expected to become an "active subject. " As Lazzarato argues, the transformation of labor marks a stage in capitalist production wherein "a collective learning process becomes the heart of productivity, because it is no longer a matter of There is a two-part reasoning to the cause of this transformation within the autonomous school of thought. The rst concerns a broader argument within the autonomous Marxist tradition that draws on Marx's Grundrisse, speci cally the idea of "the fragment on machines" that describes the autonomy afforded the worker's intellect when labor is automated via technological advancement. The automation of labor processes means that labor previously requiring human, manual labor is now accomplished through technological automation, thus reducing signi cantly socially necessary labor time (if not eradicating it entirely). This transformation in production means that new modes of production, and thus new kinds of labor, are emergent, one form being immaterial labor.
As Lazzarato asserts, "The old dichotomy between 'mental and manual labor, ' or between 'material and immaterial labor, ' risks failing to grasp the new nature of productive activity, which takes this transformation on board and transforms it, " because as he goes on to argue, "it is around immateriality that the quality and quantity of labor are organized. "
The second reason behind this transformation in work and production concerns what the autonomists refer to as "the refusal of work, " that refers to the 1960s labor protests within and beyond Italy, and the subsequent reorganization of work intended to circumvent the daily resistances and refusals to work on the part of all workers. The social unrest of the 1960s provided the terms with which a rede nition or restructuring of work became necessary so as to manage an unruly if not jaded populace of workers. This recon guration pivoted on the notion that work could become meaningful rather than monotonous and meaningless; it could in a sense become something more than, or perhaps entirely unlike, work. As Ross observes, from the 1970s onwards "a long series of management innovations designed to stimulate a jaded workforce" were enacted, such as "quality of work life programs" that intended "to inject some participation into decisionmaking and deliver more personal ful llment to employees. " These kinds of participatory initiatives, coupled with an increasing autonomy afforded to workers (made possible through both technological advancement and the restructuring of work) instilled a sense that work could be meaningful and feel good, despite the fact that these same changes marked "the onset of a long decline in job security. " These causal shifts are evident in the precarious nature of immaterial labors.
Ross's observations concerning the onset of meaningful work on the one hand, and an increasingly precarious job market on the other, are crucial to understanding the nature of immaterial labor. Immaterial labor constitutes the knowledge, social relations, and communication crucial to a large swath of commodities and services; it is as Ross observes, the "culture work" of capitalism. This labor encompasses two aspects, "the 'informational content' of the commodity" that refers to the actual changes in the work process (i.e., the skills utilized are "increasingly skills involving cybernetics and computer control"), and the labor that produces the "cultural content of the commodity, " what Lazzarato describes as "a series of activities that are not normally recognized as 'work. '" These activities include "de ning and xing cultural and artistic standards, fashions, tastes, consumer norms, and . . . public opinion"-the very cultural and creative work the interns of the culture industries aspire, and most often, perform for free. This intangibility not only makes the work highly mobile, but also it can most often occur anytime and anywhere; indeed, there is a borderlessness inherent to it, because "an idea or image comes to you not only in the of ce but also in the shower or in your dreams. "
Ideas and creativity travel with the mind, and as such extend the working day in ways that are not always anticipatory or ideal. The boundaries of the working day and work itself one loves not only makes the work itself the prize (i.e., one gets to do the work, which is the reward because one "loves" it), but also broader demands on behalf of labor become shortsighted. Indeed, "loving your work" reduces the possibility for "new forms of labor observes that "to some extent middle-class status nowadays rests upon the idea that work is something to which one has a passionate attachment" rather than middle-class wages itself. One can however only pursue this path if some middle-class comforts are already secured, such as familial wealth, housing, a postsecondary education, healthcare, a relative amount of personal freedom (namely, no children or dependents), and of course little to no debt.
Additionally, and perhaps less recognized, "love, " when used to procure labor, renders this labor less refusable, less serious, and ultimately, less like labor at all. If one truly loves something then the labor is not only the reward, but it is an act of self-actualization. The danger in this neoliberal ideology is the way in which it recon gures work as something that is not work at all, and in doing so, makes any and all demands on behalf of one's labor illegitimate. Under this mantra, work is no longer work, it is something one pursues for spiritual and existential ful llment rather than a wage and health bene ts. In this way, "do what you love" works to naturalize exploitation, because "loving" one's labor renders it non-labor. As Marxist feminists have long argued, the invocation of "love" to extract unwaged, unrecognized labor both undergirds waged labor, and characterizes feminine labor in a capitalist system. Speaking to the unwaged labor of housework, Silvia Federici asserts, "Capital had to convince us that it is a natural, unavoidable, and even ful lling activity to make us accept working without a wage. " Federici's assertion highlights how by rendering certain kinds of work spiritually or existentially ful lling, the legitimacy of a wage for this very labor becomes suspect; in other words, framing some labors as "natural" or the object of one's love and affection works towards its illegitimacy as a that while still exploitative, is vastly distinct in its effects. I assert that examining the fashion intern illustrates the ways in which the feminization of work and "do what you love" collude to disadvantage those most impacted by student indebtedness: Latinas and black women, whose representation-whether in popular media or high pro le lawsuitsis largely absent from this labor pool. The ideology of "do what you love" is most pervasive within industries that possess a high degree of social prestige (such as the culture industries of fashion, lm, writing, and music, as well as academia), and less so within professions that perform more materially necessary labor (such as manual and custodial labor, food and retail services, and the health professions), which makes the gure of the fashion intern, whose labor is most often glamorized, an especially apt case for the present study. Examining the gure of the fashion intern below, I argue that the ideology of "do what you love, " in its existential guidance merely calci es the very structural hierarchies of economic class, race, and sex that its promise implicitly offers to transcend, particularly because it predominates in industries that rely on a large swath of underpaid and unpaid labor. As I outline below, the strati cations among women evident in the AAUW's research on student debt are reproduced in the composition of fashion interns, a phenomenon I assert is made possible through the imperative to "do what you love" amidst the feminization of work.
Fashion Interns and Free Labor
Fashion is not possible without free labor. As Lauren Sherman, writing on the industry website Fashionista states, "If we don't have unpaid assistants working on set, or in the of ce, magazines wouldn't get published, lm wouldn't get developed, and fashion shows wouldn't run so smoothly. " These "assistants" Sherman mentions are interns: individuals who ll positions within fashion brands, design houses and fashion magazines, under the guise that they will receive professional tutelage and skills, with the promise of a job upon its completion. However, these promises are rarely ful lled. As the now more than thirty lawsuits led since 2010 evidence, intern labor most typically does not lead to a paid position but rather another internship, and the "skills" one acquires during these stints are most often the reproductive labor necessary to maintaining any corporate entity or business: answering phones, relaying messages, maintaining emails, organizing and cleaning the of ces, running errands, and other administrative tasks. However, as New Economy, the proliferation of this labor form has effectively become "a mainstream experience after the recession began, " and as Andrew Ross asserts, the very waged and salary positions held out as promises to interns remain "nice work if you can get it. " While intern labor is utilized across the culture industries, the fashion industry stands as the most iconic. This iconicity is due in large part to the numerous television shows (not to mention lms and magazine pro les) of this worker. It is, as Annemarie Strassel observes, a "glamorized form of labor" that remains culturally unrecognizable because of this. Diana's story is unfortunately not unique. In fact, it is quite similar to another fashion intern's story, Lauren Ballinger, who in her last semester at the American University of Paris "saved one credit before graduating to use toward an internship at W, " a leading U.S. fashion magazine. "Ms. Ballinger was paid $12.00 a day to work in W's Accessories Department, " working from eight or nine each morning until eight to ten every night, "packing, organizing, and delivering accessories to editors. " Further, Ballinger, who took the position as a part of her career training, was not only trained by other interns, and 
Wang and Ballinger's stories are not exceptional but are symptomatic of a larger trend in compelling free labor from a largely young pool of educated, ambitious individuals.
Overwhelmingly, this labor pool across culture industries is female, with 77 percent of the intern labor workforce woman-identi ed. This aspect of the labor pool not only re ects the ways in which cultural representations of the fashion intern compels young women and feminine-leaning persons to pursue it, but also points to how the skills crucial to creative industries, such as exibility, creativity, and an aesthetic sensibility, is gendered largely feminine, whether a male-identi ed or female-identi ed person performs it.
Speaking to the topic of feminine labor, Donna Haraway suggests that:
To be feminized is to be made extremely vulnerable; able to be disassembled, reassembled, exploited as reserve labor force; seen less as workers than as servers; subjected to time arrangements on and off the paid job that make a mockery of a limited work day; leading an existence that always borders on the obscene, or out of place.
The labor required of interns-free, reproductive in nature, and invisible, with erratic and overly long work hours-is overwhelmingly feminine. As Minh-ha Pham observes, the feminine labor that fashion requires contributes to the perceived triviality of fashion, which works towards its dismissal as an object of study or critique. I suggest that the gender of fashion is crucial to the perpetuation of the kind of labor exploitation characterized by the fashion intern, because in its triviality, invisibility, and lack of a wage it is rationalized as not 'real' labor and thus not 'real' exploitation, and also because the persons doing it (i.e., young, feminine persons) are culturally expected to "love" this work.
In effect, this labor is naturalized in ways that render it non-work.
In addition to gender, the labor of interns reproduces the racial hierarchies evident in the AAUW's research regarding student debt: Latinas and black women are largely absent, both in media representations and high-pro le intern lawsuits. This lack of representation points to the ways in which the feminization of work in culture industries works towards the exclusion of the most indebted: Latinas and black women. In this way, the "do what you love" ethos that justi es the precarity exemplary in the gure of the fashion intern also legitimates the racial exclusions of the fashion industry broadly. "Do what you love'" is not then merely a means with which to reorient workers to a precarious labor market, but a way to reframe the structural exclusions that reproduce industries like fashion as predominantly white. In this way, the unpaid internship-of which the fashion intern is but one-is not only a feminized job, but a racialized one. advantage from the trainee's activities (and may even experience such training as an impediment); that trainees are not entitled to a job upon completion of the training, and that there is a mutual understanding that trainees are not entitled to wages. If all six guidelines are met, then the "employee" is legally considered to be a "trainee, " or in this case an intern. However, there are several crucial limits to these guidelines, the rst of which concerns the wageless nature of this work. Originally intended to establish guidelines for apprenticeships that were for manual labor and production work, these guidelines cannot and do not account for how the U.S. labor market has changed dramatically, exempli ed here in the creative labor necessary to culture industries like fashion. As Edwards and Hertel-Fernandez note, "A serious problem surrounding unpaid interns is [that] they are often not considered employees and therefore are not protected by employment discrimination laws, " such as legislation that protects against sexual harassment, and discrimination based on race, age, or physical and/or mental ability. This is because the very statutes that are intended to protect employees in the workplace are established on the grounds of a relationship wherein the employer provides the employee with a wage, the very thing that mediates and de nes them as such. Further, these guidelines "permit (and even incentivize) the replacement of regular workers with unpaid college students and recent graduates, " because it sanctions the employer's practice of compelling free labor from intern workers under the guise of "educational purposes. " The supposed "educational purposes" are evident in the mediating body that most often arranges the internships: university programs that possess corporate contracts with the internship offering agencies. Indeed, it is dif cult to imagine any situation wherein free labor is not to the immediate advantage of an employer (or in this case, the educator). It is this aspect (i.e., the "educational purposes" that render the labor unwaged) of the unpaid positions that fosters their growth, because it is always to the employers' advantage to obtain labor for free, rather than having to invest in a waged worker. This leads to what is perhaps the most glaring problem to the proliferation of this labor: the way in which it limits the participation to students who can afford to work for free, "effectively institutionalizing socioeconomic disparities. "
The normalization of unpaid internships throughout the culture industries means that these industries-like fashion-are increasingly exclusive, reserved for those with familial and/or industry connections, and the means with which to support unpaid work. As noted in a 2012 report conducted by The Chronicle of Higher Education, internships remain the single most important factor when considering a college graduate for employment.
However, because student debt is a necessary burden for some students seeking a degree, unpaid internships-and thus some career paths-are not an option. This exclusionary entry to internships has implications regarding the composition of the very culture industries relying on intern labor. As internship servicers such as InternMatch have shown, unpaid internships contribute to the lack of diversity in certain industries. Long criticized for its exclusionary nature, fashion has most recently endured numerous public condemnations concerning structural racism. Considering the industry's reliance on unpaid internships, it is perhaps unsurprising to nd that women of color, most prominently Latinas and black women, experience dif culty succeeding in, or gaining entry into the fashion world. Additionally, when considering the ethos of "do what you love, " it seems that very few, and perhaps more importantly, very few women of color, are actually able to do so.
What the fashion intern points to then is how the immaterial, precarious labor of the culture industries manifests in highly gendered, racialized ways. Represented as a glamorous lifestyle, the fashion intern typically does not earn wages, nor does she (and she is typically a "she") obtain the waged position she was promised. The fashion intern's labor (like other precarious workers of the culture industries) is feminine in that it remains unwaged and highly exible, yet performs a socially reproductive function. Indeed, her unwaged labor is crucial to fashion's production. Similarly, when examined in the context of mass debt, the fashion intern is not merely a feminized job but a racialized one, meaning that it perpetuates the whiteness of the fashion industry through its exclusivity (i.e., being able to perform demanding work without a wage). Further, like other precarious labor forms, the fashion intern's labor is compelled and naturalized through the ideology of "do what you love"; because it is work that one "loves, " one should perform it for free, and because one "loves" it (and is willing to perform it for free), it is not work but rather an extension of one's highest self. In sum, examining the fashion intern illustrates how the feminization of work and the ethos of "do what you love" collude to disadvantage those most negatively impacted by student debt-Latinas and black women-and also perpetuates the whiteness of the fashion industry itself.
Conclusion
Examining the gure of the fashion intern, I have outlined how the labor of interns performs work crucial to fashion's production, yet remains largely unwaged. I situate the fashion intern within a broader eld of precarious workers, whose labor has been made unstable through the absence of legal contracts and the lack of protection and social bene ts, collective agreement of employment, and low wages (if any wages at all). I have argued that a crucial part of the proliferation of precarious labor forms is the ideology of "do what you love, " that compels low-wage, or entirely unwaged labor from individuals through the rhetoric of "love. " Through this ideology, labor is rendered less refusable, less serious, and ultimately, less like labor at all; because it is work that one "loves, " one should perform it for free, and because one "loves" it (and is willing to perform it for free), it is not work but rather an extension of one's highest self. This ideology is most pervasive in the very industries marked by precarity, such as the fashion industry, and thus bears in uence on who can participate in them. In other words, if the labor necessary to the culture industries is unwaged (especially the entry-level positions like internships), then the industry is structurally foreclosed to those who cannot afford to work for free. As the AAUW research suggests, persons who cannot afford to work for free are most typically Latinas and black women, and indeed, their absence is evident in representations of the fashion intern, whether in popular media or high-pro le lawsuits. In this way, the ideology of "do what you love, " calci es the very structural hierarchies of economic class, race, and sex that its promise implicitly offers to transcend. Taken in the context of mass student debt, "do what you love, " as an ideology that sustains precarious employment in the culture industries, bears relevance for what these industries look like. If unwaged work is the requirement for entry, then certainly those able to do so will comprise the bulk of its workers.
Notes

